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Despite a commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions, Asia, in fact, is full 
of regional institutions and frameworks in various forms. The rise and fall of regional 
institutions in Asia is an extremely dynamic process. Using a game theory approach, this 
paper hypothesizes that the dynamic nature of Asian regionalism can be explained by a 
"regionalism cycle." The institutional outcome of regionalism in Asia has been cyclical 
because the game played by Japan and the United States does not have a stable 
equilibrium. This paper tests the hypothesized regionalism cycle using actual cases of 
regional institutions in the field of financial cooperation and regional summit meetings.  
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of Asian Regional Institutions 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite the commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions
1, Asia, in fact, 
is full of regional institutions and frameworks in various forms. There are a 
considerable number of regional frameworks with different sets of membership that 
cover different issue areas. The rise and fall of various institutions in Asia is an 
extremely dynamic process. In addition to a number of existing institutions and those 
that no longer exist, there have also been many proposed institutions in Asia that 
were once considered but never established. Therefore, the most pertinent questions 
regarding institutions of Asian regionalism are: Why is the rise and fall of regional 
frameworks remarkable? Why have there been so many frameworks? And finally, why 
do the activities of a certain regional framework become insignificant after a certain 
period? 
 
This paper argues that there is a "regionalism cycle" in Asia. The cycle exists in terms 
of the membership of institutions, which is one of the most critical aspects of 
institutions (Koremenos et al., 2001). Various countries' reactions to a number of 
regionalist projects have clear patterns, with the critical determining factor being the 
membership of each regional framework. As a result of such patterns, the institutional 
evolution of Asian regionalism has become cyclical with respect to institutional 
development and the eventual waning and/or abolishment of such institutions since 
changes in membership lead to changes in the effectiveness of institutions.   
  
The structure of this paper is two-fold. First, it presents a hypothesis on regionalism 
cycle using game theory. The rise and fall of various regional institutions is the result 
of states' rational choices in terms of their membership preferences. Since the pay-off 
matrix among concerned parties (especially Japan and the United States [US]) in this 
game does not have a stable equilibrium, there is no stable institutional equilibrium. 
Hence, the institutional outcome is cyclical. The second half of the paper analyzes the 
actual development of Asian regionalist projects in light of the proposed regionalism 
cycle. The rise and fall of various regional financial cooperation meetings and regional 
summits are examined. In particular, sequences of various regionalist projects 
proposed by a number of countries are closely analyzed. Only when various projects 
are analyzed together can we find that Asian regional cooperation has a cyclical 
feature.   
 
 
2. Hypothesis:  Regionalism Cycle 
 
2.1      Cost and Benefit of Various Regional Frameworks   
 
Sponsoring a regional framework entails both costs and benefits. The cost–benefit 
structure of sponsoring a regional framework varies depending on issue areas 
covered by an institution. While a regional framework covering a particular issue 
brings a specific cost–benefit structure to each member, generalization is possible to 
a certain degree. In such instances, sponsoring international frameworks or 
institutions is considered to be supplying an international public good (Kindleberger, 
1973). Sponsoring a (regional) framework or institution for cooperation among states 
entails coordination costs (e.g., monitoring, enforcement, policy coordination, and 
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side-payment) (Mattli, 1999) and various economic costs (e.g., providing finance and 
opening domestic markets).
2  It also entails benefits such as a gain in prestige and the 
diffusion of favorable rules, as well as an increase in influence and the imposition of 
taxes on other members (Kindleberger, 1973).   
 
The costs and benefits that member countries incur and enjoy in sponsoring a 
regional framework depend on their relative position in the group (Table 1). It may be 
safe to consider that the lead state (number 1 state) gains relatively large benefits, 
while at the same time incurring relatively large costs as well. The long-lasting 
question on whether sponsoring a framework or institution is beneficial or costly to the 
leader, which is known as the benevolent versus predatory hegemon debate 
(Kindleberger, 1973; Snidal, 1985; Conybeare, 1987), rests on which side is 
emphasized. As has been argued by Lake (1993) and Russett (1985), we should 
recognize that the leading position entails the both, rather than developing a decisive 
argument. The role of the number 2 state in a regional framework has a critical impact 
on the lead state’s costs and benefits. The leader may expect the number 2 state to 
behave as its junior partner by sharing the burden of sponsoring the framework, but 
without giving comparable benefit to the number 2 state. The rational choice of the 
leader is to request only the number 2 state to share the burden with it rather than 
requesting all participating members to equally shoulder the burden, which could 
increase the unpopularity of the leader among other members.       
Table 1: Leader's Cost and Benefit 
  Number 1 state (Leader)  Number 2 state 
Benefit  Large (this becomes larger when the 
number 1 state considers prestige to be 
critical) 
Small 
Cost  Large (this can be reduced by requesting 
the number 2 state to share the burden) 
Small (this can be increased if the number 
2 state is required to share the burden) 
Source: Author's original. 
 
Based on the analysis above, we can then consider the cost and benefit of sponsoring 
regional frameworks with various combinations of membership from the Japanese 
and US perspective (Table 2). Basically, the cost–benefit structure of Japan and the 
US follows Table 1, but a minor modification is necessary to reflect their actual 
capacities and preferences. When there is no framework, there are no associated 
costs and benefits that Japan or the US incur or enjoy. Therefore, the net benefit of 
having no institution is zero for both Japan and the US since both the cost and benefit 
are zero. Other than this scenario (no framework), the magnitude of the costs and 
benefits that Japan and the US incur or enjoy are different. Moreover, these costs and 
benefits for Japan and the US are often contrasting as is explained below. The base 
line for the cost–benefit analysis of other scenarios is the “no framework” scenario.   
 
                                                  
2  Providing long-term finance for investment and short-term liquidity in the case of financial crisis is the important 
role of the hegemon (Kindleberger, 1973). In addition, providing official development assistance (ODA) is 
another important responsibility of the hegemon.   3    |   
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Table 2: Cost–Benefit Structure
3 
Japan 
Asia–Pacific Framework   No  Framework  Asia-Only   




Benefit None  Extremely  Large  Small  Small 
Cost  None Large  Large Medium 
Net Benefit  None (0)  Positive (2)  Negative (–2) 
Slightly Negative 
(–1) 
Source: Author's original. 
United States 
Asia–Pacific Framework   No  Framework  Asia-Only 




Benefit None  Negative  Medium Medium 
Cost None  None  Very  small  Large 
Net Benefit  None (0)  Negative (–2)  Positive (2) 
Slightly Negative 
(–1) 
Source: Author's original. 
 
 
Sponsoring an Asia-only framework in which Japan is able to hold the leading position 
brings an extremely large benefit to Japan. The benefit of being the leader in a 
regional institution is especially large for Japan partly because the country considers 
prestige as critically important (Yasutomo, 1983). In contrast, the benefit of having 
membership in an Asia–Pacific framework where the US holds the leading position is 
small to Japan. Being a leader in an Asia-only framework certainly comes with large 
costs for Japan, but these can be offset by extremely large benefits. The cost that 
Japan incurs in the US-sponsored Asia–Pacific framework depends on how actively it 
participates in such a framework. If Japan is obliged to participate actively and 
contribute financially to the framework’s projects as a junior partner of the US, then 
the cost becomes relatively large. However, the cost becomes smaller if inactive 
participation (virtual non-participation) is possible.   
 
From the US perspective, the establishment of an Asia-only regional framework from 
which it is excluded would be a negative as US influence on Asian countries would be 
diminished by the establishment of such a framework. Compared with this scenario, 
participating in a regional framework such as an Asia–Pacific framework is a better 
                                                  
3  Actual figures in the net-benefit column are very rough estimates based on a qualitative analysis. Qualitative 
assessment of benefit and cost are categorized into the following: "very small" as 1, "small" as 2, "medium" as 3, 
"large" as 4, "very large" as 5 and "extremely large as 6". The net benefit is the difference between benefit and 
cost. For example, Japan gains an extremely large benefit (6) while it incurs a large cost (4) in an Asia-only 
framework; therefore Japan's net benefit becomes 2.       Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 42    |       4 
 
 
option for the US in terms of benefits, which would be medium-sized.
4 The 
establishment of an Asia-only framework does not require any specific cost to the US 
just because it is not a member, while the net cost–benefit of this scenario is negative. 
Meanwhile, the cost that the US incurs in an Asia–Pacific framework is small when 
Japan resigns itself to play the role of junior partner to the US, while the cost becomes 
larger if Japan refuses to do so.     
 
2.2   Game  Pay-off  Matrix 
A game pay-off matrix for Japan and the US can be deduced based on the cost 
–benefit structure for each of the two countries explained above. The choice for Japan 
and the US is whether to participate or not in a regional framework. Non-participation 
would result in either non-member status or virtual non-participation (inactive 
participation) in which no substantial contribution to the framework is made by the 
member (e.g., attendance at meetings only).   
The four combinations of choices available to Japan and the US in the matrix are 
equivalent to the four types of regional frameworks explained in the previous section. 
First, when neither Japan nor the US participates in a regional framework, such a 
situation is equivalent to there being no framework. This includes both the actual and 
virtual nonexistence of a regional framework—also known as a dysfunctional regional 
framework—or a situation where both Japan and the US do not seriously engage in 
the framework. Second, when only Japan participates but the US does not participate 
in a regional framework, such a regional framework is considered an Asia-only 
framework. Third, when both Japan and the US participate substantially, such a 
situation is equivalent to an Asia–Pacific framework that includes active Japanese 
participation. Finally, when the US participates and Japan does not actively participate, 
such a situation can be described as an Asia–Pacific framework with inactive 
Japanese participation. As will be explained later in more detail, this situation usually 
happens after the establishment of an Asia–Pacific framework in which the form of 
Japanese non-participation is basically inactive participation (virtual non-participation), 
rather than non-membership status since withdrawing from a framework is difficult in 
practice.  
 
At this stage, we can produce a pay-off matrix following the cost–benefit structure of 
Japan and the US as explained above (Table 3). When neither Japan nor the US 
participates (no framework), both Japan and the US gain zero (0). When Japan 
participates and the US does not participate in a regional framework (Asia-only 
framework), Japan gains two (2) and the US loses two (–2). If both Japan and the US 
participate in a regional framework (Asia–Pacific framework), Japan loses two (–2) 
and the US gains two (2). However, in a situation where Japan decides not to actively 
participate in an Asia–Pacific framework, both Japan and the US lose one (–1).   
 
 
                                                  
4  The benefit that the US gains by holding the leading position in a regional framework is small when compared 
with Japan in a similar leading role. This is because the US is a hegemon that is able to pursue its agenda 
through global institutions. Therefore, there is no need for the US to be a leader in a regional framework. In 
contrast, Japan is keen to be a leader in a regional institution to pursue its agenda.   5    |   
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Table 3: Pay-Off Matrix 
 
US 
Japan  Participation Non-Participation 
Participation (-2,2)  (2,-2) 
Non-participation (-1,-1)  (0,0) 
         Note:  (X,  Y),  X:  Japan's  pay-off;  Y:  US'  pay-off. 
         S o u r c e :   A u t h o r ' s   o r i g i n a l .  
 
What is noteworthy about the pay-off matrix is that this game does not have a stable 
equilibrium. There is no dominant strategy for both Japan and the US. Either country 
can increase its gain by changing its choice to maximize its interest once the other 
country has made a choice. For example, if Japan attempts to establish an Asia-only 
regional framework that the US was either unaware of or unable to participate in, this 
combination of Japanese participation and US non-participation would provide Japan 
with the highest pay-off (2). However, under this situation, the US could potentially 
increase its pay-off from –2 to 2 by moving from non-participation to participation. This 
change in US behavior would, in effect, reduce Japan's pay-off from 2 to –2. Then, 
Japan could decide to reduce its involvement in the transformed Asia–Pacific 
framework because inactive participation would be less costly (–1) than sharing the 
costs of maintaining the US-sponsored framework (–2). Since it is costly for the US to 
support a framework without Japanese participation (–1), the US might disengage 
from activities under the transformed framework. Since there is no stable equilibrium 
situation in this game matrix, the institutional outcome becomes cyclical.     
 
2.3   Regionalism  Cycle 
 
Based on the game pay-off matrix explained above, the cycle of regionalism, which 
focuses on membership development, can be deduced (Figure 1). The cycle has four 
phases.  
Figure 1: Change in Choices 
US 
Japan  Participation Non-Participation 
Participation       Phase  Two  (-2,2)  Phase One (2,-2) 
Non-participation       Phase  Three  (-1,-1)       Phase  Four/Zero  (0,0) 
 
US 
Japan  Participation Non-Participation 
Participation       Phase  Two  (-2,2)  Phase One (2,-2) 
Non-participation       Phase  Three  (-1,-1)       Phase  Four/Zero  (0,0) 
 
  To the Next Cycle 
Source: Author’s original Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 42    |       6 
 
 
Phase One: Japan proposes and attempts to establish a regional framework that 
includes Asian countries only. The exclusion of the US is successful when the 
framework is established as the US is unaware of it.   
 
Phase Two: When the US becomes aware of the existence of a new regional 
framework that it is not a member of, the US attempts to gain membership. If the US 
successfully obtains membership, the framework becomes an Asia–Pacific framework, 
and is no longer an Asia-only framework. The alternative scenario of Phase Two is 
that if the US were to have difficulty gaining membership to the Asia-only framework, a 
new Asia–Pacific framework would be sponsored by the US to compete with the 
existing Japan-sponsored Asia-only framework.   
 
Phase Three: As a result of the extension of membership to the US, Japan loses an 
interest in the transformed regional framework in which the US now plays a dominant 
role. Or if a new US-sponsored Asia–Pacific framework were created to compete with 
the Japanese-sponsored Asia-only framework, Japan would not actively participate in 
the new framework.   
 
Phase Four/Zero: Since it is costly for the US to support the transformed framework, 
which would now be an Asia–Pacific framework, by itself, the US also begins to 
disengage from the transformed framework’s activities, which results in the 
breakdown of the framework. Alternatively, both a Japan-sponsored Asia-only 
framework and the US-sponsored Asia–Pacific framework would become 
dysfunctional due to competition and duplication between the two. 
 
An important point of this cyclical process is that eventually Japan will explore the 
establishment of a new Asia-only framework if (i) the previous framework is 
transformed into an Asia–Pacific framework through US participation or (ii) the old 
Asia-only framework declines in the face of competition from a new Asia–Pacific 
framework. Therefore, after the cycle reaches Phase Three and before reaching 
Phase Four/Zero, Phase One of a subsequent cycle begins anew. An illustration of 
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Source: Author's original. 
 
 
There is one caveat with this analysis of the regionalism cycle, namely, the limits 
placed on the predictive power of the model by major powers' membership 
preferences. The major powers' incentives to establish a new regional group and/or 
abolish an old group are a central question of research. The focus of this paper is the 
major powers' desire to supply a favorable institution with a preferred membership. In 
addition to the supply side, the demand side, which is determined by whether or not 
minor powers support the proposed institutions, is also critical to understanding the 
final institutional equilibrium (Snidal, 1994). This paper emphasizes the supply side of 
regional frameworks in order to clarify that the struggle for leadership, not the 
absence of leadership, has been the fundamental reason why the rise and fall of 
regional institutions and frameworks is significant in Asia. The proliferation of regional 
frameworks can best be explained by the over-supply of institutions.   
 
 
3. Examination  of  the Regionalism Cycle 
 
This section examines the actual development of regionalism in light of the 
regionalism cycle detailed in the previous section. Regional frameworks in the field of 
finance and through summitry are analyzed in turn. Trade regionalism is not covered 
in this paper because most trade regionalism, such as free trade arrangements/areas 
Japan does not actively 
participate in the 
transformed framework. 
 
Japan establishes (or 
attempts to establish) 
 a  new  Asia-only 
framework. 
The US attempts to gain 
membership. Asian-only 
framework is transformed 
into Asia–Pacific. 
The US gives up 
maintaining the 
transformed framework 










Japan establishes (or 
attempts to establish) 
 a  new  Asia-only 
framework. 
To the Next Cycle 
 
Second Cycle 
The US attempts to gain 
membership. Asian-only 
framework is transformed 
into Asia–Pacific. 
Japan does not actively 
participate in the 
transformed framework. 
 
The US gives up 
maintaining the 
transformed framework 
and it starts to break down. 
Figure 2: Model Cycle of Asian Regionalism Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 42    |       8 
 
 
(FTAs), are basically perpetual in nature.
5  Since the wane and/or fall of FTAs is a rare 
occurrence, FTAs seldom follow a cyclical process. Since the rise and fall of regional 
institutions became significant in Asia only after the end of the Cold War, the main 
analysis focuses on institutions in the 1990s. 
 
3.1      The Cycle of Regional Financial Cooperation Meetings 
 
First cycle. The first attempt at creating a regional meeting among financial officials 
was made by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) soon after the end of the Cold 
War.
6 Then Vice Finance Minister, Tadao Chino, considered the establishment of a 
regional meeting on financial matters as being critical for Asian countries to have their 
own voice in setting the financial and economic agenda at global-level meetings 
rather than simply following the lead of the US and Europe.
7  He proposed to establish 
the Four Markets Group comprising countries that have major financial markets in the 
region. The first Four Markets Group meeting took place in Hong Kong, China in 
May  1992 with the participation of Japan; Australia; Singapore; and Hong Kong, 
China. At meetings held twice a year, the Four Markets Group aimed to strengthen the 
relationship among regional financial authorities and exchange market information, 
particularly on foreign exchange markets. The participants in these meetings were at 
the level of director general within their respective institutions (i.e., the third-ranking 
ranking official). 
 
In March 1997, the Four Markets Group expanded to become the Six Markets Group 
with the inclusion of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US. At the same 
time, the US pushed for the level of the participants from each financial institution to 
be raised from director general to vice minister (i.e., the second ranking official) (Ostry, 
1997). Then Japanese Vice Finance Minister for International Finance, Katō Toshihiko, 
who chaired the first Six Markets Group meeting, once recalled how the US sought to 
join the Four Markets Group only after first learning of its existence (Katō et al., 2002). 
At the time, the US did not consider the group to be particularly useful, given the 
existence of multilateral fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
Asia –Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), both of which it considered to be more 
important. However, the US decided to join the new group for the simple reason that it 
was determined not to be excluded from a regional financial cooperation forum.
8 
Because the Four Markets Group did not use a geographic label, the inclusion of the 
US did not lead existing members to question whether the US was considered to be a 
part of the region or not. In the end, the US (and the PRC) joined the group, which 
subsequently changed its name to the Six Markets Group.   
 
 
                                                  
5  Trade forums such as Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can decline. Therefore, theoretically 
speaking, there is also a possibility that trade forums form a cyclical process. However, trade forums are not 
included in the analysis because the number of cases is too low.   
6  Before the Four Markets Meeting, a central bank forum called the Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific 
Central Banks (EMEAP) was established in 1991 under the initiative of the Bank of Japan. But central bank 
forums such as EMEAP is not included in the analysis of this paper. For central bank forums, see Hamanaka 
(2009) and Haas (1989).   
7  Australian Financial Review (February 1997). 
8  As reported in Korean Economic Review (13 March 1997). 9    |   
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1997 onwards 
Japan does not actively 
participate in the Six 
Markets Group. 
May 1992 
Japan establishes the Four 
Markets Group. 
March 1997 
The US joins the 
transformed Six Markets 
Group. 
1999 
The US gives up 
maintaining meetings of 











Japan proposes the Asian 
Monetary Fund. 
May 1999   
Japan supports establishing   
the ASEAN+3 FMM 
proposed by the PRC. 
Second Cycle  Third Cycle 
November 1997 
The US counter-proposes 
the Manila Framework 
Group. 
1998 onwards 
Japan does not actively 
participate in the Manila 
Framework Group. 
2004 
The US gives up 
maintaining the Manila 
Framework Group. 
Figure 3: Regionalism Cycle of Financial Cooperation 
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US in the Chang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization 
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What will be Japan's 















Source: Author's original. 
 
 
This regional financial meeting among six key Asia–Pacific economies attracted 
considerable attention. While APEC had expanded its membership significantly by 
1997 and grown somewhat dysfunctional in the process, the smaller Six Markets 
Group, which included three major countries( the PRC, Japan, and the US), was 
viewed as an optimal forum for substantial discussion. Many observers were 
expecting it to upgrade to a minister-level gathering and possibly evolve into an Asian 
version of the G6 or G7.
9  
 
However, the group lost centripetal force soon after the upgrade. It was decided at the 
first meeting in Tokyo that the expanded Six Markets Group would hold meetings only 
on an annual basis, unlike its predecessor, the Four Markets Group, which had met 
twice a year.
10 It soon became apparent that an annual event was ineffective for 
economic surveillance purposes. As a consequence of this, no meetings have been 
held since February 1999 under the framework of the Six Markets Group. Moreover, 
Japan’s MOF expressed interest in reviving the Four Markets Group, rather than 
utilizing the Six Markets Group, to promote regional financial cooperation.
11  In fact, in 
                                                  
9  As reported in New Strait Times (4 March 1997) and Yomiuri Shimbun (6 March 1997). 
10  In the first meeting organized by MOF in March 1997, it agreed to organize the second meeting of the group in 
the second half  of  1998.   
11  Nikkei Shimbun (22 August 1999). Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 42    |       10 
 
 
September 1999, the Four Markets Group meeting was re-organized in Tokyo without 
the participation of the PRC and US. The Four Markets Group has since held 
meetings twice a year, while the Six Markets Group has stopped holding meetings.
12  
 
Second cycle. Immediately after the Four Markets Group was transformed into the 
Six Markets Group in March 1997, Japan’s MOF launched an initiative known as the 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). One should note that this is before the onset of the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis. After an internal study jointly conducted with the 
Institute for International Monetary Affairs (IIMA), MOF planned to propose the AMF 
during an Asian Development Bank (ADB) annual meeting held at Fukuoka in May 
1997 under the name Gyōten Initiative (Lipscy, 2003). MOF, however, eventually 
decided to postpone its proposal because it judged that the plan was unlikely to win 
support from several of the region’s economies. In particular, the Republic of Korea 
(Korea) and Taipei,China were suspicious of Japan’s regionalist policy, partly because 
it had not invited them to the meeting of the Six Markets Group held a few months 
before, nor were they supportive of the overall plan (Lipscy, 2003). 
 
The 1997/98 Asian financial crisis increased the momentum for establishing the AMF. 
For example, the contributors to the Thai rescue package sensed the “unity of Asian 
countries” in the face of the crisis.
13 Under this favorable situation for Japan, Vice 
Minister Sakakibara Eisuke decided that the time was right to realize Japan’s goal of 
establishing the AMF immediately. The prospective members were to include 
Australia; the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; 
Singapore; and Thailand. Japan sent an unofficial paper outlining the proposed AMF 
to prospective members in August. The US was not included among the recipients of 
this proposal.   
 
However, Japan's attempt to establish the AMF while at the same time keeping the 
US unaware was not successful. One of the recipients of the outline proposal must 
have alerted the US because on 14 September, US Assistant Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence Summers called Sakakibara in the middle of the night and complained 
about the Japanese project, reportedly saying: “I thought you were my friend.”
14 On 
17 September, the US sent out a letter to all APEC finance ministers that was signed 
by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan 
Greenspan. The letter implied that the US was interested in the formation of an 
Asia–Pacific cooperative framework to tackle crisis resolution issues. However, the 
letter emphasized the need to link such a framework with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). At a meeting held on September 21 in Hong Kong, China and attended by 
prospective AMF members as well as the US, it was agreed that the AMF would not 
be created. It is important to note that the US specifically opposed the creation of the 
AMF, rather than the creation of a regional monetary fund in general. Fred Bergsten, a 
close aide to the Clinton administration and Head of Institute for International 
Economics (IIE) in Washington, argued at the time that an Asia–Pacific Monetary 
Fund, which included the US, would be useful (Bergsten, 1998).   
 
Even after the AMF meeting in Hong Kong, China in September 1998, the US felt that 
Asian countries were not convinced of the capacity of the IMF to resolve the ongoing 
                                                  
12  However, the activities of the revived Four Markets Group did not develop into anything substantial. 
13  The US did not contribute to the Thai rescue package (Sakakibara, 2000).   
14  Ibid. 11    |   
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crisis and it feared the possibility that Asians were still exploring regional financial 
arrangements. According to Blustein (2001), the US Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs, Timothy Geithner, produced a report on 30 September 1997 
arguing that "the approach outlined in the Rubin–Summers letter was likely to prove 
insufficiently compelling to avoid some regional financing mechanism. Our best case 
outcome would probably be an ad hoc arrangement for mobilizing bilateral resources 
alongside IMF programs (underline supplied).” Accordingly, in November, concerned 
parties had a meeting in Manila to finalize discussions on regional financial 
cooperation. The participants of the Manila meeting were: Japan; the PRC; Hong 
Kong, China; Korea; Indonesia; Malaysia; Singapore; Brunei Darussalam; the 
Philippines; Thailand; Australia; New Zealand; the US; and Canada. Three 
international institutions—the IMF, ADB, and World Bank—also attended. At this 
meeting, the participants agreed to establish the Manila Framework Group as a new 
semi-annual regional surveillance mechanism to complement the IMF.     
 
Japan did not actively utilize the Manila Framework Group. A common view of the 
Manila Framework Group among Japanese MOF officials was that the US had 
established the group with the intention of blocking the formation of the AMF.
15 At  one 
point, MOF released a critical press statement arguing that Manila Framework Group 
members (implicitly naming the US) should make financial contributions to regional 
financial arrangements if they were really serious about the crisis resolution rather 
than    the prevention of future crises.
16  
 
The US also started to disengage from activities under the dysfunctional Manila 
Framework Group. In 2000, the group stopped releasing a joint statement at the 
conclusion of its semi-annual meetings. Moreover, the group has not held a meeting 
since 2004. The nearly co-equal voices of the US and Japan in the Manila Framework 
Group seem to have resulted in dysfunction. The Manila Framework Group was 
unique because it mixed US-style surveillance with Asian-style peer pressure (Higgott, 
1998), but such a new model did not function well in practice. 
 
Third cycle. Soon after the failure of the AMF proposal, another opportunity to 
establish a regional financial meeting among Asian countries was created by the PRC. 
At the second ASEAN+3 Summit held in December 1998 in Hanoi, the PRC proposed 
establishing the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Deputies Meeting (FMDM).
17 Japan 
strongly supported the PRC's idea. Subsequently, the first ASEAN+3 FMDM was held 
in March 1999 and the first ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting (FMM) was held the 
following month, back-to-back with the ADB annual meeting in Manila.
18 At the third 
ASEAN+3 Summit held in November 1999 in Manila, the PRC insisted on the 
significance of strengthening the ASEAN+3 financial process. The PRC’s proposal 
was supported by other participants (especially Japan) who collectively agreed to 
formalize the ASEAN+3 FMM (Kikuchi, 2001). One year later, in May 2000, the 
ASEAN+3 FMM agreed upon the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The implementation of 
activities under the ASEAN+3 FMM were led by the Japanese MOF. At the time, the 
general view of CMI among Japanese MOF officials was that it was being led by the 
Japanese MOF. As one former MOF official said: "it would have been possible to use 
                                                  
15  For example, see Kuroda, 2004 
16  See: http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokkin/frame.html 
17  Asahi Shimbun (17 December 1998). 
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a name that clearly associated [CMI] with the Japanese initiative, but Japan played 
down its leadership and decided to give credit to the host country and city, namely 
Thailand and Chiang Mai."
19  
The current situation of Asian financial cooperation can be described as phase one of 
the third cycle. An Asia-only financial meeting—the ASEAN+3 financial process—is 
the dominant cooperative framework and in 2009 the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM) was established under this framework. Notably, Japan and 
the PRC agreed to each make financial contributions to the CMIM fund equivalent to 
32% of the total. So far, the US has not officially attempted to participate in the CMIM 
nor made a counterproposal on an Asia–Pacific financial cooperative framework.   
 
3.2   The  Cycle  of  Regional  Summit  Meetings 
 
First cycle. Japan has been interested in regional summits since the 1970s.
20 In 
early 1976, soon after Prime Minister Miki Takeo had attended the Rambouillet 
Summit, he proposed an Asian Summit. However, he failed to win widespread support. 
When ASEAN members first held a summit meeting in August 1976, Japan attempted 
to participate but was stopped mainly due to opposition from Indonesia. Nevertheless, 
Japan successfully demonstrated its special relationship with ASEAN by sending 
messages from the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to ASEAN leaders expressing 
Japan’s desire to strengthen relations with ASEAN. The US State Department also 
planned to send a similar message to the ASEAN Summit and held consultations on 
doing so with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The State Department 
was, however, dissuaded from sending a similar message to ASEAN leaders.
21 Sudo 
(1992) considered this political maneuver by Japan as giving the impression of an 
exclusive role for Japan in the region.   
 
Japan's attempt to get involved in the ASEAN Summit was successful in the following 
year when the Fukuda Administration declared an equal partnership between Japan 
and ASEAN, which became known as the Fukuda Doctrine. The understanding of the 
Japanese MOFA was that Japan would participate in the ASEAN Summit with 
observer status, rather than participate in an ASEAN–Japan Summit held 
back-to-back with the ASEAN Summit.
22 When ASEAN held its third summit in 1987, 
Japan again successfully participated as an observer.     
 
Meanwhile, the US sought to upgrade APEC from a meeting at the foreign and trade 
ministers-level to a regional summit attended by leaders of each member country. 
While APEC was established in the late 1980s as a trade forum under a Japanese 
and Australian initiative, its diplomatic inclination became more significant through the 
US-led upgrade. Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating was the first to propose that 
leaders attend the annual APEC meeting. He consulted with US President George 
H.W. Bush about the idea in early 1992. Although President Bush showed interest in 
Keating’s proposal, he was unable to host an APEC Summit with leaders in 
                                                  
19  Kuroda (2004). 
20  The first regional summit in Asia was the Bungdong meeting in 1955. This meeting was actually a pan 
Asia–Africa summit and was a one-off event.   
21  Yano (1978). 
22  See: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/initiative.html 13    |   
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attendance due to being voted out of office in November 1992. However, US 
President Bill Clinton, who was inaugurated in January 1993, actively pursued the 
idea of an APEC Summit (Funabashi, 1995). President Clinton officially proposed to 
host the first APEC Summit in a speech made in San Francisco in July 1993 before 
his first Asian tour. The first APEC Summit would eventually be held in November of 














Source: Author's original. 
 
 
Japan was indifferent to the idea of holding an APEC summit from the beginning. 
Australian Prime Minister Keating sent out a letter in April 1992 in which the idea of an 
APEC summit was explained to the leaders of key APEC members, including the US, 
Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. Although Keating received positive 
responses from the others, Japan was said to have been reticent about the proposal. 
Moreover, although Keating urged Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi to 
support the proposed APEC Summit when he visited Japan in May 1993, Japan did 
not finally approve it until July 1993 once the establishment of the APEC Summit had 
become unavoidable. A senior US official recalled that Japan was reluctant to accept 
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Takanaka Kimio, a former senior official at the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO), a government-linked think tank, straightforwardly criticized the Clinton 
administration for upgrading APEC from minister-level to leader-level by misusing the 
position of the APEC chairmanship (Takanaka, 2001). Since APEC was elevated to 
the summit level in 1993, Funabashi (1995) wrote: “Japan has not taken a leadership 
role.” Although Japan maintained some interest in the APEC Summit until 1995 when 
it held the chairmanship, its attitude hardened toward in the late 1990s. For example, 
in 1998, the Diplomatic Blue Book of Japan abolished a subsection on APEC.   
 
 
The US engagement with the APEC Summit in particular and APEC in general also 
weakened substantially in the second half of the 1990s. President Clinton was absent 
from the APEC Summit in 1995 and 1998, which is one of the main reasons for 
APEC’s drift at the time (Ravenhill, 2001). US President George W. Bush attempted to 
utilize the Shanghai APEC Summit in 2001 for the nontraditional purpose of national 
security. However, this attempt led to further indifference toward APEC’s activities 
among other members (Pempel, 2008). 
 
Second cycle. When the APEC Summit became a dominant summit in the region, 
Japan attempted to organize a smaller regional summit for Asian countries only. In 
January 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Southeast Asia and proposed to hold 
the Japan–ASEAN Summit on an annual basis. However, ASEAN feared a situation in 
which the summit would be dominated by Japan and therefore made the 
counter-proposal of an ASEAN+3 Summit. The first ASEAN+3 Summit was held in 
Kuala Lumpur in December 1997. Since 2005, an East Asia Summit has been held 
with the participation of ASEAN+3 members plus Australia, New Zealand, and India. 
Only signatories to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) are 
eligible to attend this summit. The US did not sign the TAC until 2009.   
 
The current situation of the summit process is similar to phase one of the second 
regionalism cycle. However, given that the US became a signatory to the TAC in 2009, 
it is possible to regard that the US will be able to participate in the East Asia Summit in 
the near future. In fact, some Asian countries have shown interest in US participation. 
Notably, Japan has expressed the view that US involvement in the East Asia Summit 
would be desirable (Bōno, 2005). Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka 
insisted during a previous ASEAN+3 meeting that the US should participate in the 
East Asia Summit as an observer (full participation would have been impossible at the 
time due to the TAC issue.)
23 In contrast, the PRC has been reluctant to involve the 
US in the East Asia Summit.
24  
 
Japan's interest in involving the US in the East Asia Summit would appear 
inconsistent with the hypothesis presented in this paper that Japan seeks to exclude 
the US from a regional framework. However, Japan is in the process of being replaced 
by the PRC as the most dominant power in Asia and it is now the PRC, and not Japan, 
that would hold the leading position in an Asia-only regional framework. This means 
that the new seeker of an exclusionary regionalism policy in the field of summitry is 
the PRC. Therefore, the PRC now has an incentive to establish an Asia-only regional 
summit, just like Japan did so in the past.   
                                                  
23  Asahi Shimbun (7 May 2005); Sankei Shimbun (7 May 2005). 
24  For details of the PRC’s and Japan’s preferences with regard to East Asia Summit membership, see Hamanaka 
(2008).   15    |   
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4.  Conclusion   
 
This paper develops a hypothesis of a regionalism cycle using a game theory 
approach and examines its explanatory power based on actual cases of regional 
institutions in Asia. Since the pay-off matrix for this game does not have a stable 
equilibrium, meaning that there is no dominant strategy for both Japan and the US, 
either the US or Japan can increase its gain by changing its choice in reaction to the 
other's choice. As a result of this, the institutional outcome of Asian regional 
cooperation becomes cyclical.   
 
This hypothesis fits very well with empirical evidence on the rise and fall of regional 
financial institutions. Japan has traditionally sought to establish an Asia-only regional 
framework, with the US subsequently attempting to gain membership. Japan would 
then abandon an old framework once it had included the US and attempt to establish 
a new Asia-only regional framework. The hypothesis also explains the development of 
regional summitry to a degree. Japan's attempts to hold a regional summit among 
Asian countries only and the US attempts to establish a summit for the Asia–Pacific 
region were competing efforts.   
 
Interestingly, Japan is currently being replaced by the PRC as the state holding the 
leading position in an Asia-only framework and which therefore attempts to establish 
such regional frameworks. So long as the US is excluded, the PRC will hold the 
leading position in an Asia-only framework, just as Japan did in the past. The PRC’s 
newfound dominance is evident in the diplomatic field. Therefore, it is not surprising if 
the PRC, not Japan, becomes the hunter of an exclusionary regional summit. As 
Fareed Zakaria puts it: "Beijing thought up the East Asia Summit as a regular meeting 
and one where, with the United States absent, the PRC would be the star."
25 In the 
case of finance, however, the power balance between Japan and the PRC is still 
nearly equal as the example of their co-equal CMIM contributions suggests. However, 
the PRC eventually may pursue an exclusionary Asia-only financial cooperation 
framework once its financial power overwhelms that of Japan.   
 
Despite the commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions, a 
considerable number of regional frameworks have been established and 
subsequently abolished in Asia. The struggle for leadership, not the absence of 
leadership, has been the fundamental reason for the dynamic rise and fall of many 
Asian regional frameworks.   
 
 
                                                  





ADB. 2008. Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity. 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
 
C. Fred Bergsten. 1997. Open Regionalism. Institute for International Economics 
Working Paper. 
 
N. Bono. 2005. Higashi Ajia Samitto [East Asia Summit]. Available at: 
http://www.jiia.or.jp/keyword/200512/07-bounoseihiroshi.html. 
 
J.A.C. Conybeare. 1987. Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International 
Commercial Rivalry. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Y. Funabashi.1995. Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC. Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics. 
 
M. Haas.1989. The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation. New York: 
Praeger. 
 
S. Hamanaka. 2008. Comparing summitry, financial and trade regionalism in East 
Asia: from the Japanese perspective. In Christopher Dent (ed.) China, Japan 
and Regional Leadership in East Asia. 
 
S. Hamanaka. 2009. Asian Regionalism and Japan: The Politics of Membership in 
Regional Diplomatic, Financial and Trade Groups. London: Routledge. 
 
R. Higgott.1998. The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment. 
New Political Economy. 3(3). pp. 333–56. 
 
R.W. Hu. 2009. Building Asia Pacific Regional Architecture: The Challenge of Hybrid 
Regionalism.  The Brookings Institution Working Paper. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution.   
 
T. Katō et al. 2002. Dai-7-kai Genron NPO Ajia Senryaku Kaigi [Round Table of Asian 
Strategy at Genron NPO.   
T. Kikuchi. 2001. Higashi Ajia Chiiki-shugi no Kanou-sei [The Potential of East Asian 
Regionalism]. Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs]. 494. pp. 16–33. 
 
C. Kindleberger.1973. The World in Depression. pp. 1929–1939. London: Allen Lane. 
 
H. Kuroda. 2004. Gen Kiriage [Re-peg of the Chinese Yuan]. Tokyo: Nikkei BP. 
 
D. Lake.1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked 
Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? International Studies Quarterly. 
37(4). pp. 459–89. 
 
P. Lipscy. 2003. Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal. Stanford Journal of East 
Asian Affairs. Vol. 3. 
 
W. Mattli.1999. Logic of Regional Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 17    |   
 
 
Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall 
of Asian Regional Institutions 
S. Ostry.1997. Canada and the Year of Asia-Pacific: Trade and Investment. Paper 
Presented at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Foreign Policy 
Conference. 
 
T.J. Pempel. 2008. How Bush bungled Asia: militarism, economic indifference and 
unilateralism have weakened the United States across Asia. The Pacific 
Review. 21 (5). pp. 547–581 
 
J. Ravenhill. 2001. APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
B. Russett. 1985. The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain 
Really Dead? International Organization. 39 (2). pp. 207–31. 
 
D. Snidal. 1985. Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. International Organization. 
39(4). pp. 579–614. 
 
D. Snidal. 1994. The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and 
Institutions. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 6(4). pp. 449–72. 
 
S. Sudo. 1992. The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese 
Foreign Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
K. Takanaka. 2001. Keizai Tögö no Power Game [Power Game of Economic 
Integration]. Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho. 
 

























 Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 42    |       18 
 
 
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration
* 
 
1.  “The ASEAN Economic Community and the European Experience” by 
Michael G. Plummer 
2.  “Economic Integration in East Asia: Trends, Prospects, and a Possible 
Roadmap” by Pradumna B. Rana 
3.  “Central Asia after Fifteen Years of Transition: Growth, Regional Cooperation, 
and Policy Choices” by Malcolm Dowling and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
4.  “Global Imbalances and the Asian Economies: Implications for Regional 
Cooperation” by Barry Eichengreen 
5.  “Toward Win-Win Regionalism in Asia: Issues and Challenges in Forming 
Efficient Trade Agreements” by Michael G. Plummer 
6.  “Liberalizing Cross-Border Capital Flows: How Effective Are Institutional 
Arrangements against Crisis in Southeast Asia” by Alfred Steinherr, 
Alessandro Cisotta, Erik Klär, and Kenan Šehović 
7.  “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism” by 
Richard E. Baldwin 
8.  “Measuring Regional Market Integration in Developing Asia: a Dynamic 
Factor Error Correction Model (DF-ECM) Approach” by Duo Qin, Marie 
Anne Cagas, Geoffrey Ducanes, Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos, and Pilipinas F. 
Quising 
9.  “The Post-Crisis Sequencing of Economic Integration in Asia: Trade as a 
Complement to a Monetary Future” by Michael G. Plummer and Ganeshan 
Wignaraja 
10.  “Trade Intensity and Business Cycle Synchronization: The Case of East Asia” 
by Pradumna B. Rana 
11.  "Inequality and Growth Revisited" by Robert J. Barro 
12.  "Securitization in East Asia" by Paul Lejot, Douglas Arner, and Lotte 
Schou-Zibell 
13.  "Patterns and Determinants of Cross-border Financial Asset Holdings in East 
Asia" by Jong-Wha Lee 
14.  "Regionalism as an Engine of Multilateralism: A Case for a Single East Asian 
FTA" by Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
15.  "The Impact of Capital Inflows on Emerging East Asian Economies: Is Too 
Much Money Chasing Too Little Good?" by Soyoung Kim and Doo Yong 
Yang 
16.  "Emerging East Asian Banking Systems Ten Years after the 1997/98 Crisis" 
by Charles Adams 19    |   
 
 
Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall 
of Asian Regional Institutions 
17.  "Real and Financial Integration in East Asia" by Soyoung Kim and Jong-Wha 
Lee 
18.  “Global Financial Turmoil: Impact and Challenges for Asia’s Financial 
Systems” by Jong-Wha Lee and Cyn-Young Park 
19.  “Cambodia’s Persistent Dollarization: Causes and Policy Options” by Jayant 
Menon 
20.  "Welfare Implications of International Financial Integration" by Jong-Wha Lee 
and Kwanho Shin 
21.  "Is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) an Optimal Free Trade 
Area?" by Donghyun Park, Innwon Park, and Gemma Esther B. Estrada 
22.  "India’s Bond Market—Developments and Challenges Ahead" by Stephen 
Wells and Lotte Schou- Zibell 
23.  “Commodity Prices and Monetary Policy in Emerging East Asia” by Hsiao 
Chink Tang 
24.  "Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?" by Jong-Wha Lee and Ju 
Hyun Pyun 
25.  “Aging in Asia: Trends, Impacts, and Responses” by Jayant Menon and Anna 
Melendez-Nakamura 
26.  “Re-considering Asian Financial Regionalism in the 1990s” by Shintaro 
Hamanaka 
27.  “Managing Success in Viet Nam: Macroeconomic Consequences of Large 
Capital Inflows with Limited Policy Tools” by Jayant Menon 
28.  “The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism: From the 
Perspective of Service Trade Liberalization in Asia” by Shintaro Hamanaka 
29.    “East Asian and European Economic Integration: A Comparative Analysis” 
by Giovanni Capannelli and Carlo Filippini 
30.  “Promoting Trade and Investment in India’s Northeastern Region” by M. 
Govinda Rao 
31.  "Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling" by Soyoung Kim, Jong-Wha Lee, 
and Cyn-Young Park 
32.  “India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration” by Rajiv Kumar 
and Manjeeta Singh 
33.  “Developing Indicators for Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation” 
by Giovanni Capannelli, Jong-Wha Lee, and Peter Petri 
34.  “Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia” by Chee 
Sung Lee and Cyn-Young Park Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 42    |       20 
 
 
35.  "Regional Economic Impacts of Cross-Border Infrastructure: A General 
Equilibrium Application to Thailand and Lao PDR" by Peter Warr, Jayant 
Menon, and Arief Anshory Yusuf 
36.  "Exchange Rate Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Global Financial 
Crisis" by Warwick J. McKibbin and Waranya Pim Chanthapun 
37.  “Roads for Asian Integration: Measuring ADB's Contribution to the Asian 
Highway Network” by Srinivasa Madhur, Ganeshan Wignaraja,and Peter 
Darjes 
38.  "The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia" by Robert Rigg 
and Lotte Schou-Zibell 
39.  “Complements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade 
Liberalization at the Sectoral Level” by Mitsuyo Ando, Antoni Estevadeordal, 
and Christian Volpe Martincus 
40.  “Regulatory Reforms for Improving the Business Environment in Selected 
Asian Economies—How Monitoring and Comparative Benchmarking can 
Provide Incentive for Reform” by Lotte Schou-Zibell and Srinivasa Madhur 
41.  “Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Determinants of Trade 
Flows in East Asia” by Prema–Chandra Athukorala and Jayant Menon 
 
* These papers can be downloaded from: (ARIC) http://aric.adb.org/reipapers/ or (ADB)                 
www.adb.org/publications/category.asp?id=2805 
  Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall 
of Asian Regional Institutions
Despite a commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions, the rise and fall 
of Asian regional institutions is in fact an extremely dynamic process. This paper argues 
that there is a “regionalism cycle” in Asia that helps to explain the dynamic nature of Asian 
regionalism. 
About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing 
member countries substantially reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their 
people. Despite the region’s many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of the world’s 
poor: 1.8 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, with 903 million struggling on less 
than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive economic growth, 
environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main 
instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity 
investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.
Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org/poverty
Publication Stock No.   Printed in the Philippines